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The uniqueness of cultures, universality and normativity – with special reference 
to the normative meaning of differentiation 
The inevitable presence of similarities between different cultures sets a 
limit to the (irrationalist) claim that the uniqueness of every culture 
precludes the comparability of cultures. Investigating the background of 
this untenable view opens up the way to arrive at a reassessment of the 
role of continuity and universality. This provides the basis of an account of 
the normative meaning of biotical analogies within the various normative 
aspects of reality. The characterization of undifferentiated societies in a 
contrasting way highlights the normative meaning of societal differentiation. 
Examples of an excessive expansion of the power of particular societal 
spheres, such as the domain of the church or the scope of science (during 
the Middle Ages and the modern development of society), demonstrate that 
the course of factual events frequently does not observe the normative 
(sphere-sovereign) structural boundaries for differentiated societal 
collectivities. 
1. Introduction 
Leslie Newbigin once made the observation that it was still fashionable 
during the 19th century to speak about primitive and civilized cultures. 
This   practice   reflects  the   fact  that  theorizing   during  that   era  was 
                                           
1 Paper Read at an International Conference of the Association for Calvinistic 
Philosophy on “Cultures and Christianity A.D. 2000”. Bovendonk, Hoeven, The 
Netherlands, 21-25 August 2000. 
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dominated by organic images and metaphors. In particular, the role of 
Darwinistic evolutionism even caused ideas regarding development to 
speak about culture in the singular – only with the emergence of cultural 
relativism it was changed to the plural: cultures (cf. Lemaire, 1976:88 and 
Griffioen, 1986:84). The 20th century increasingly became critical about 
this mode of speech. The uniqueness of cultures received more 
emphasis and at most it was permissible to say that cultures are 
different.2 
Does this mean that we have to deny the existence of any norms for 
cultural development and disclosure? Are there no underlying norms or 
principles guiding cultural activities and societal structuration? If cultures 
are uniquely different, does it mean that they lack any similarities? And if 
there are no similarities between cultures, will it still be possible to speak 
about culture in general? 
Furthermore, in the absence of similarities, are cultures at all related to 
universal features? If so, what then is the relationship between the 
universal side and the individual side of cultures? 
Once again these questions give rise to other ones. For example, if the 
underlying universality of the concept of “culture” enables one to apply 
this term to the most diverse cultures conceivable, is it not then evident 
that this universality is a lasting feature? In other words, is it possible to 
conceive of universality without relating it to constancy? Or does this 
necessarily lead to a static metaphysics of being, as objected to by 
postmodernism? 
It is clear that a serious treatment of these questions can neither side-
step the problem of cultural relativism nor can it avoid the contemporary 
postmodern attempts to escape from the universality of “reason”. But first 
of all we briefly have to focus our attention on the following question: 
2. What brought universal reason to an impasse?3 
During the last number of centuries many more or less related changes 
emerged on the horizon of the self-understanding of the Western 
scholarly mind. The glory of an unbridled appreciation of the power and 
scope of the universalities of human reason did not survive the confines 
of the age of Enlightenment too well – although the way in which many 
                                           
2 Most of the time the term “culture” will be employed in a broad sense, practically 
equivalent to “society” or “civilization.” 
3 A more extensive analysis is found in Strauss (1996). 
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portray the long-standing influence of modernity may create that 
impression. 
Soon after the hey-day of 18th century rationalism radically new 
alternatives emerged. Niebuhr, the tutor of Leopold von Ranke, for 
example, demonstrates the transition from the 18th to the 19th century in 
a remarkable way. From the Romantic movement – including Goethe 
and Schiller (Germany), Bilderdijk and Da Costa (the Netherlands), and 
Shelley and Keats (Britain) – Niebuhr received his appreciation of 
mythical thought and that inspired him to make a plea for the wealth 
enclosed in the historical way of thought. 
In opposition to Plato, who accepts only knowledge directed at the true 
(static) being of things as worthwhile, Niebuhr is convinced that historical 
change is the true source of knowledge. This kind of knowledge is the 
most appropriate type of knowledge for the human being as a vital and 
self-developing entity. 
Whereas the 18th century by and large is characterized by the deification 
of universal (conceptual) knowledge, the rise of historicism highlights an 
emphasis on the importance of historical change per se. Yet this 
irrationalist and historicist reaction to Enlightenment rationalism contain 
hidden problems that became explicit only by the end of the 19th century. 
It is noteworthy that this process was anticipated by the first critical 
reactions to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. It was in particular Jacobi, 
Hammann and Herder who pointed out that Kant neglected the nature of 
language in his Critique of Pure Reason.4 
The powerful tradition of natural law which held sway from Grotius up to 
Kant continued the conviction that there are universally valid principles of 
law embedded in human reason – such as the rule: pacta sunt servanda 
(agreements ought to be kept). At the beginning of the 19th century the 
historical school of law ushered the mentioned new historicist mode of 
thought into legal science – and as a consequence it considered the 
following two theses not open to serious objection: (1) positive law as 
such is a historical phenomenon that cannot deny its link with the past; 
(2) there is no room for a second system of law (with an eternal and 
unchangeable content) next to or above the historically developed 
positive law (cf. Dooyeweerd, 1939:2 ff.). In the opening article of the first 
                                           
4 That Kant indeed distorted the meaning of history emerged also more clearly during 
the 19th century – beyond the rise of historicism as such. The discovery of non-
Euclidean geometries (by Gauss and Lobatsjevski) relativized Kant’s table of 
categories by making it clear to what extent his analysis of understanding was 
historically dependent upon Newton’s Principia of 1686. 
The uniqueness of cultures, universality and normativity …  
232 Koers 67(2) 2002:229-250 
volume of the Zeitschrift für geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft (1815) 
F.C. von Savigny explicitly puts the “historical school” in opposition to the 
“un-historical school” of rationalistic natural law (cf. Von Savigny, 1948: 
14 ff.). 
The weak point in the conception of natural law is given in its acceptance 
of a dual validity: in addition to valid positive law it accepts an equally 
(universally) valid positive law. Although Habermas does not explicitly 
mention the problem of a duplicated  validity entailed in the view of 
natural law, he does point out that modern “natural law, in preserving the 
distinction between natural and positive law, assumed a burden of the 
debt from traditional natural law. It holds on to a duplication of the con-
cept of law that is sociologically implausible and has normatively 
awkward consequences” (Habermas, 1996:105). 
2.1 Cultural universals or cultural relativism? 
The ultimate effect of the rise of historicism is that it uprooted the idea of 
normativity. Initially the Baden school of neo-Kantian philosophy (Rickert, 
Windelband, Weber) postulated next to factual reality a realm of ideal 
being to which timeless ideas belonged. These ideas were supposed to 
have an absolute validity since they are not subject to change. Only 
when factual (natural) reality is related to these timeless values, culture 
comes into existence (it emerges through Wertbeziehung). 
Dilthey, Spengler, Heidegger’s irrationalistic reaction to his teacher 
Husserl, Jaspers and Troeltsch, all contributed in their own way to the 
general Zeitgeist of the early 20th century in terms of which an appeal to 
universal principles lost its credibility. The theme of values thus also lost 
its timeless ideal being since they were now transformed into the domain 
of (historically changeful) subjectivity: every person has to design (con-
struct) his or her own “values.” It should therefore not surprise us that 
managers involved in mission and vision statements easily nowadays 
talk about “finding” “new values”! 
Because historicism did realize that concept-formation, based upon 
universal features, is blind with respect to the uniqueness and contingen-
cy of historical events, this incongruence finally paved the way for the 
well-known “turn to language”.5 Already Medieval philosophy taught that 
the senses have access to individuals – an option once again pursued by 
                                           
5 Where Gadamer discusses language as horizon of a hermeneutic ontology, he refers 
to Von Humboldt whose interest in individuality did not lead him away from “the 
universality of the concept” (Gadamer, 1998:439) – Von Humboldt still wanted to 
acknowledge the unbreakable correlation between these two features. 
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the rise of positivism during the late 19th century (Mach and his 
followers). 
2.2 Do different cultures “think” differently? 
Prinsloo (1989) approaches this problem from the angle of the 
relationship between logic and culture. He discusses examples offered 
by thinkers such as Peter Winch and Evans Pritchard. Whereas these 
thinkers want to demonstrate that consistency is something different for 
Westerners and “primitives,” he successfully shows that both are actually 
observing the (underlying, universal, logical) principle of non-contra-
diction. 
The applicability of this principle, however, presupposes the nature of 
logical concept formation – and concept formation, in turn, rests on the 
nature of universality. Yet, as we have mentioned, it was exactly this 
problem – regarding the relationship between universality and individual-
lity – that haunted the new claims of historicism during the 19th century. 
2.3 The limits of concept formation 
Concept formation inevitably uses universal features. It is indeed blind to 
what is unique and historically changing. The claim that cultural events 
are purely unique and individual in nature therefore leads to the mind-
boggling question of 19th-century historicism: how is it possible to com-
prehend what is unique and individual if our only access is through 
concept-formation which is founded upon universal features? This 
question underscores the classical problem regarding the relationship 
between universality and individuality.6 
The legacy of restricting knowledge to universality (and therefore to 
concept formation) is quite old. Having introduced his primary substance 
Aristotle realized that the purely individual substance cannot be grasped 
conceptually – inducing him to introduce the secondary substance as the 
universal substantial form of entities (cf. Metaph., 1035 b 32; De Anima, 
412 b 16). When this house burns down, says Aristotle, then houseness 
is still intact. The implicit identification of knowledge with conceptual 
knowledge already present in Aristotle’s approach is continued by the 
adage: omne individuum est ineffabile (cf. De Vleeschauwer, 1952:213). 
The following statement of De Vleeschauwer illustrates this legacy 
                                           
6 Cf. the following statement where Habermas highlights this tension explicitly: “How is 
it possible to grasp the meaning of a unique life context by unavoidably using general 
categories?” (Habermas, 1970:203). 
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sufficiently: “But knowledge of the individual is simply impossible” (De 
Vleeschauwer, 1952:213). 
2.4 The ultimate source of (cultural) relativism 
The metaphysical “chain of being”, the hall-mark of the synthesis 
between the Greek speculation about eternal forms and the Medieval 
attempt to accommodate it to the biblical understanding of creation, 
resulted in the position of realism which assumed a threefold existence of 
universals: before creation (as ideas in God’s mind); inherently within 
creatures as their universal substantial forms; and subjectively within the 
human mind as universal concepts. The late-Scholastic nominalism of 
Duns Scotus and William of Ockham rejected the first two.7 But they did 
accept universals within the human mind (either as universal concepts or 
as universal names). Their nominalism therefore in this respect still 
adheres to the rationalistic trait of realism which identifies conceptual 
knowledge (on the basis of universal features) with knowledge as such. 
Paradoxically enough, nominalism at the same time adheres to the basic 
claim of irrationalism, so clearly elaborated in the stance of modern 
historicism with regard to changeful historical reality, namely that what-
ever there is (outside the human mind) is strictly individual.8 
Since language seems to be able to mediate between universality and 
individuality in a way that transcends the limitations of concept formation, 
postmodern writers tend to speak about a general shift from concept to 
meaning, from thought to language. For example, Appleby et al. (1996:1) 
write: “Using a conceptual shorthand, we could say that meaning has 
replaced cause as the central focus of attention”. 
The outcome of the shift from thought to language is significant: the 
allusivity and equivocal nature of language, particularly well revealed in 
the role of metaphors, expands and deepens the historicist critique of 
supposedly universally valid concepts – thus apparently strengthening 
the relativism already inherent in historicism. 
It must be noted, however, that Dilthey and particularly Troeltsch did not 
want to concede that the liberation achieved through historicism 
                                           
7 The ambiguous nature of nominalism is treated in more detail in Strauss (1996). 
8 Karl Mannheim did grasp something essential of this twofold nature of nominalism: 
“Nominalism proceeds from the unjustifiable assumption that only the individual 
subject exists and that meaningful contextures and formations have being only to the 
extent that individual subjects think them or are somehow oriented toward them in a 
conscious manner” (Mannheim, 1982:224). 
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inevitably ends in relativism. In his dissertation Klapwijk extensively 
explains this point (cf. Klapwijk, 1970:58 ff., 249 ff.). Yet it was Nietzsche 
who did see the close link between relativism and the secularization of 
Christianity. In this regard Hollinger (1994:66) aptly remarks: “Relativism 
is based on Nietzsche’s view that absolute truth is found on ‘our longest 
lie’, the belief in God”. 
Van Riessen points out that Nietzsche increasingly became aware of the 
opposition in his thought, that between Christ at the Cross and the 
Nietzschean ideal of the dyonysian, nihilistic Übermensch (Van Riessen, 
s.a.:101). Nietzsche was at least aware of the fact that the anti-Christ 
presupposes Christ: “He must have realized that he did nothing else but 
imitating Christ and reacting against him” (Van Riessen, s.a.:106). 
3. Does the uniqueness of different cultures makes it 
impossible to compare them? 
Acknowledging cultural diversity and historical uniqueness does not 
eliminate universality but presupposes it. Only if the phenomenon of 
culture is something universally human will it be possible to differentiate 
between the peculiarities of different cultures and to gain an insight into 
the process of differentiation occurring within societies. 
Within a postmodern intellectual climate one may argue that since each 
culture is unique there are no universal ways in which one talks about 
them. This mode of thinking currently surfaces in many circles. Van 
Huyssteen (1998:2-3), for example, holds a similar conviction with 
respect to the relationship between religion and science: “Postmodernity 
challenges us to deal with the fact that we have been robbed of any 
general, universal, or abstract ways to talk about the relationships 
between religion and science today”. 
Now suppose that we accept this position for a moment and suppose 
that we then proceed with an investigation of the legal, the economic and 
the social practices of different “cultures”, against the background of 
assessing their diverging standards for rationality. Surely, the outcome 
will be that these differences are real and that many peculiarities will be 
brought to light. But what is lost sight of in the postmodern frame of mind 
is the shared and continued presence of the economic, the jural, the 
social and the rational. If these dimensions of culture and society did not 
transcend any particular culture and society, recognizing the implied 
differences would be impossible. Differences only appear on the basis of 
similiarities, on the foundation of shared properties and features, which in 
their universality not only transcend any particular “culture”, but which 
make possible the mentioned dimensions of different “cultures”. 
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Yet, in his rejection of “foundationalism” Van Huyssteen (1999:63) writes: 
As will soon become clear, nonfoundationalism, in a strong reaction 
against modernist and universalist notions of rationality, highlights the 
fact that every historical context, and every cultural or social group, has 
its own distinct rationality. 
Van Huyssteen apparently does not realize that the differentiated 
manifestation of the “rational” in different “cultural and social groups” 
does not negate the universality of rationality, but actually presupposes 
it! If this statement is not true, why do we still speak about rationality in all 
the different instances (!) of rationality (!)? What makes it worse is that 
the statement made by Van Huyssteen entails a universal claim, un-
mistakenly evidenced in the use of (the universal quantifier) “every”: 
“every (My emphasis – DFMS) historical context, and every (my 
emphasis – DFMS) cultural or social group.” 
Similarly, the continued presence of particular legal practices, economic 
systems and societal collectivities within the most diverse “cultural and 
social groups” testifies to the same undeniable universal existence of 
these dimensions in various societies. 
The acknowledgement of universal conditions making possible human 
cultures and societies in the first place does not entail that those 
acknowledging them had become victims of the rationalistic (“modernist”, 
“foundationalist”) fallacy of elevating one’s own insight into an un-
changing truth. The constancy of what is universal is never identical to 
any historically and lingually conditioned insight into these conditions. 
Moreover, only on the basis of accepting the inevitable presence of (the 
constancy of) universality is it possible to come to a positive assessment 
of normativity.  
4. Normativity, changefulness and development 
Given the historicist and hermeneutical challenge to universality, we now 
have to return to the problem of cultural development. If we want to 
support Prinsloo (1989) in his reaction against the extreme conse-
quences of historicism with regard to cultural diversity, then we must be 
able to justify a position which can account for the nature of normativity 
without abolishing the positive contribution of historicism and the 
linguistic turn. 
• Historicism liberated us from the misplaced rationalistic pride as 
though it would be possible to arrive at a-temporal truths outside a 
specific historical context. We can appreciate this insight positively 
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without succumbing to the temptation to elevate historical changeful-
ness to an encompassing basic denominator ultimately determining 
whatever we experience. 
• The linguistic turn in addition realized that not only thinking, but also 
historical circumstances, constantly call for an understanding within a 
lingual context, i.e. it requires interpretation. But also in this case we 
have to point out that these two conditions, that of historicity (by the 
way: a universal) and linguisticality (note: another universal) are just 
what has been said about them: they are two conditions of being 
human among many other ones. Admiring them as though they were 
the only conditions of being human, distorts their own intrinsic 
meaning, because as soon as we succumb to such a reduction the 
constancy and universality of these two conditions themselves turn 
out to be threatened.9 
Assessing cultural development presupposes the contrast between less 
and more developed, or more extreme, between undeveloped and highly 
developed. The qualifiers in these two contexts of specification are 
respectively: (i) more / less, and: (ii) low / high. 
It is clear that (i) echoes numerical intuitions, whereas (ii) analogically 
reflects spatial intuitions. Sometimes sociologists employ the distinction 
between (iii) “traditional societies” (i.e., societies inclined to perpetuate 
established societal patterns) and “non-traditional societies” (i.e., socie-
ties involved in dynamic processes of social change). In the case of (iii) 
we note the intuitions of constancy (the kinematic) and change (the 
physical). Yet the phenomenon of development does not appear in any 
one of these intuitions. Closer investigation shows that the term develop-
ment transcends all four of these mentioned modes of explanation (i.e., 
the numerical, the spatial, the kinematical and the physical). Con-
sequently, we have to consider the contribution offered by the biotic 
mode of explanation. Development in its original biotic sense entails two 
correlated and mutually related phenomena: (i) differentiation and (ii) 
                                           
9 Grondin displays a clear understanding of this impasse with regard to historicism: 
“Neither the Gadamerian claim to universality – which seems to pertain to language, 
historicity, and his own philosophy as well – nor its denial by Habermas and Derrida 
has achieved any final clarity. One might well suppose that ‘universality’ refers to the 
universal validity of some proposition. If so, it would be easy to show that herme-
neutics is stuck in a logical or pragmatic contradiction. Some have tried to construe 
the universal claim of hermeneutics as climaxing in the thesis that everything is 
historically conditioned, a thesis supposed to be universally valid. If this thesis is 
meant to apply universally, then it must apply to its own claim, which must itself be 
historically limited and therefore not universal. The universal claim of hermeneutics is 
thus considered self-contradictory” (Grondin, 1994:10). 
The uniqueness of cultures, universality and normativity …  
238 Koers 67(2) 2002:229-250 
integration. Within the biotic time-order for life – expressed in the cycle of 
birth, growth, maturation, ageing and dying – every living entity is subject 
to a biotic process of differentiation. Its counter-part is given in the 
requirement that such a process of differentiation must remain inte-
grated, for otherwise the process of life will fall apart, i.e., it will dis-
integrate – a negative effect that may result in a process leading to the 
opposite of life, namely death. 
If it is therefore the case that living entities (plants, animals and human 
beings according to their function within the biotic aspect of reality) are 
subject to processes of differentiation and integration, does that then 
serve as a justification for “extending” these categories in such a way 
that they also apply to “cultures” and to “human society”? 
Various trends of thought during the 19th century – both philosophical 
and special scientific ones – indeed over-emphasized biotical analogies. 
This misplaced organicism amounted to an identification of social 
phenomena with biotical phenomena. As a result human society itself – 
just think about the approach of Herbert Spencer – was seen as a “biotic 
organism,” constituted by different “organs.” 
During the 20th century many sociologists became highly critical in 
respect of this legacy. They wanted to move away from the employment 
of biotical terms altogether. Without making a distinction between 
“analogy” and “metaphor,” Fichter (1968:6 ff.) refers to the “imaginative 
analogies” used to explain “social life”. In a similar vein, but not as totally 
exclusive, Giddens remarks: “There are few today who, as Durkheim, 
Spencer and many other in nineteenth-century social thought were prone 
to do, use direct organic analogies in describing social systems” 
(Giddens, 1986:163).10 
Although Fichter (1968:6) straight-forwardly rejects biologistic, mechani-
tic, psychologistic and other approaches to sociology, he also does not 
critically reflect on the use of the expression “social life”. 
However, as soon as we bring into play the nature of an analogy, which 
displays the remarkable feature of differences shown within moments of 
similarities,11 then the danger of reduction may be avoided. The mere 
fact that sociologists from all possible theoretical orientations do not 
                                           
10 Throughout this work of Giddens we nevertheless repeatedly find the expression 
“social life” (my italics – DFMS). 
11 That is, two things or features are similar in the respect in which they differ and vice 
versa. 
 D.F.M. Strauss 
Koers 67(2) 2002:229-250 239 
succeed in suspending the use of the phrase “social life” reveals the 
inevitability of employing such biotical analogies in sociological theori-
sing. 
Of course within the tradition of system theory, which emerged during the 
first half of the 20th century on the basis of a generalization of the 
second main law of thermodynamics and Von Bertalanffy’s organismic 
biology, biotic analogies continued to feature in societal theorising. With-
out showing in any way an awareness of the fact that the term 
“differentiation,” in its original meaning, refers to the biotic aspect of 
reality, it is therefore more than accidental that Luhmann, who explicitly 
works within the tradition of system theory, would argue for the 
inevitability of using this term. Not only does he support his position on 
the basis of historical research (cf. Luhmann, 1985), since in a syste-
matic sense he also points out that no single trend in sociological 
theorising succeeded in getting away from its use: 
In fact, all of the criticism that has been aimed at this concept and its 
application in different social theories has been unable to eliminate it 
completely, no matter how justified the individual arguments may have 
been. The concept of (social) differentiation simply proved irreplace-
able. So the question must be asked: why? (Luhmann, 1990:409). 
Unfortunately his subsequent analysis does not systematically account 
for the differences between biotic development (evolution) and social 
evolution, for when he enters into a discussion of the phenomenon of 
social evolution he explicitly states: “At present the concept of evolution 
is used in the same sense as the one conferred on it by Darwin” 
(Luhmann, 1990:428). On this basis he interprets “chance” to mean the 
“absence of system coordination”. As a consequence he considers 
“evolution that begins from any system-state” to be “improbable”: “What 
evolution theory ultimately tries to explain is the becoming probable of 
what is improbable” (Luhmann, 1990:428). 
Luhmann thus becomes a victim of a genetic approach which can no 
longer account for universal constant structural principles lying at the 
basis of societal development and in that sense do not fit the opposition 
of probable and improbable. Furthermore, his first examples simply show 
that he deviates from the very meaning of biotical analogies in the 
explanation of societal differentiation, as could be seen from his 
challenge to “systems theory” which has “to explain how and under what 
conditions territorial [societies] are transformed into larger units 
(lineages, clans, villages), and these again into still larger ones (tribes)” 
(Luhmann, 1990:428). Suddenly the (biotically sensitive) nuanced 
analysis of the meaning of differentiation gave way to the simple 
numerical-spatial perspective of smaller and larger. 
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His reference to “lineages, clans, and tribes” are to the point if one wants 
to understand undifferentiated societies, but “villages” are present both in 
differentiated and undifferentiated societies. Let us proceed with a brief 
sketch of the undifferentiated nature of the extended family, the clan (sib) 
and the tribe, for highlighting the contrast between differentiated and 
undifferentiated societies will enhance an insight into the normative 
meaning of social differentiation. 
4.1 Societies in an undifferentiated condition 
The first general characteristic which can be pointed out is given in the 
indication which we have chosen: its being undifferentiated. This un-
differentiated feature marks both its foundation and its qualification. 
Natural things, for example, are characterized by a unique base-function 
(called their foundational function) and their distinctness ultimately 
depends on that aspect of reality which guides the structural unity of their 
functioning – it is called their qualifying function. The formula C3H6O may 
yield the following (chemically distinct) structures: CH3CH2CHO or 
CH3COCH3. The same applies to C4H4O4 where a different spatial 
organization results in two different kinds of acid (Maleic acid and 
Fumaric acid). In other words, molecules such as these have their 
foundational function in the spatial aspect and they are qualified by the 
physical aspect. Plants are qualified by the biotic aspect and animals by 
the sensitive mode (the biologist, Adolf Portmann [1969:86], says that 
animals are instinctively secured and bound to a specific milieu). 
In an undifferentiated society such univocal radical-typical functions as 
are found in nature are absent.12 All activities in such a society are 
bound together in one undifferentiated organizational form. In a 
differentiated society, by contrast, each distinct social form of life 
possesses its own form of organization, which coheres with the fact that 
each societal life-form as such is univocally characterized by its own 
differentiated qualifying function. 
Kammler suggests that the term “natural people” be avoided owing to the 
idyllic connotation attached to it by Rousseau. According to his under-
standing of the discipline of ethnology [cultural anthropology] and 
sociology, human societies are called “primitive” (we would prefer to say: 
undifferentiated) when they meet the following two requirements: 
• if its technology is still largely undeveloped and accordingly its 
productivity is relatively insignificant; and  
                                           
12 Cf. the more detailed analysis contained in Dooyeweerd (1997-III:346-376). 
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• if it harbours a low degree of socio-cultural differentiation – in other 
words, the realization of political and administrative, economic, 
juridical, cultic religious and educational functions initially bound 
together in the family bond are still absent or they are at least only 
present in a rudimentary form. 
The counter-part of “undifferentiated” societies is then designated as 
“complex societies” (Kammler, 1966:17-18). 
Since undifferentiated societies are encapsulated in an undifferentiated 
organizational form, the possibility of differentiated qualifying functions is 
precluded. The diversity of societal life-forms which, in the course of a 
gradual process or cultural-historical differentiation (and disclosure)13 
come to the fore, are bound together in an undifferentiated manner within 
such a society. That is why such a society does not only exhibit an 
economic aspect, because the whole acts as something which is 
recognised on a differentiated cultural level as an economically qualified 
societal collectivity – such as the firm. In cases like these an un-
differentiated society partially manifests itself in the form of an economic 
enterprise such as a hunting, agricultural or cattle farming type. Similarly, 
an undifferentiated society does not merely exhibit a jural aspect, 
because as a whole it acts in the fulfilment of the functions which, on a 
differentiated level of societal development, are performed by an in-
dependent state. The same applies to the faith aspect – the undifferen-
tiated society acts as a whole in a cultic-religious capacity, similar to a 
collective faith community in a differentiated society. Within the total 
organizational form of an undifferentiated society we therefore find a 
diversity of structurally typical “evaginations”, which time and again 
brings its totality to those activities which are performed by independent 
life-forms within differentiated societies. 
This state of affairs implies that the correlate of an undifferentiated 
foundation (viz. one total organizational form) is given in an undifferen-
tiated qualification. It means that there can be no possibility of a univocal 
qualifying function, because one of the interlaced structures performs the 
leading role. This is obvious from the nature of the most basic type of 
undifferentiated societies. This type of society, which binds parents, 
children and grandchildren together in a patriarchal unit, puts the 
patriarch and the oldest son in such a position that it cannot be ex-
                                           
13 Disclosure here refers to the opening up of the anticipatory analogical moments within 
the modal aspects of reality. However, in the present context we will not enter into a 
discussion of the process of disclosure. 
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clusively derived from the blood relationship which exists between them 
– for that a specific kind of historical organization of power is required. 
The extended family does not only evince a family structure, because in 
its undifferentiated total structure other life-forms are also interwoven. 
The presence of the political structure is clear from the (political) force 
with which the patriarch maintains internal order and peace. With equal 
clarity the economic enterprise can be distinguished through the way in 
which the subsistence economy functions. The question is: which one of 
the interlaced structures takes the lead in the undifferentiated total 
structure? 
The role which the (fatherhood-related) family structure plays in the 
extended family is truly of a central leading nature – despite the fact that 
the interwoven family structure itself does not inherently possess a 
permanent structure of super- and sub-ordination. 
The sib (clan or gentes), which apparently only occurs when agriculture 
and livestock farming partly or completely replaces hunting as the basis 
of economic life, is a larger group of relations (where either only the 
father’s or the mother’s line of descent is taken into account) which is 
organized in a coordinated way. Normally, membership is dependent on 
blood relationship, that is to say, it rests on natural birth. However, the 
sib is so large that it is no longer possible (as in the extended family) to 
assume direct descent from a communal father – although such descent 
functions as a fictitious presupposition or mythological conception. 
Besides activities like the ancestor cult (typical of an eventually different-
tiated cultic institution), carrying out revenge (which within a more 
differentiated context, is carried out by an independent state with its 
judiciary system and penal law-sphere), and like the presence of forms of 
division of labour, also the family structure finds its place within the total 
structure of the sib. In reality this interwoven family takes on the role of 
the undifferentiated leading structure within the sib – a leading role which 
rests on a particular historical form of power organization (just as in the 
case of the extended family). 
It is only the stronger organized tribe that displays such a prominent 
political organization that the interwoven family structure cannot any 
longer take the lead in it. Nonetheless, there is not yet any mention of an 
enduring monopolistic organization of the sword power in this leading 
political structure (as in the case of a true state), because even fights 
between members of the same tribe do not provoke any tribal punish-
ment – only a relative of someone who is killed in such a fight could 
consider revenge. 
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5. Differentiation and integration as norms for societal 
development 
If it is the case that one cannot escape from the acknowledgement of 
biotical analogies in an analysis of aspects such as the social, the 
economical or the jural then one has to combine this perspective with the 
obvious normative nature of the post-sensitive (psychical) aspects of 
reality. This integrated perspective highlights the insight that every modal 
analogy within the structure of any normative aspect (from the analytical 
up to and including the faith aspect), articulates a fundamental modal 
norm within the aspect concerned. On the basis of the biotic analogy 
within the structure of the social aspect one may discern the (modal-
aspectual) norms of social differentiation and social integration. 
In respect of the biotic analogy within the economic aspect, Hart (1984: 
158) asks significant questions:  
What about growing economies? … The newspapers are sure that 
economies grow, whether slowly, quickly, or hardly at all. Is such talk 
meant literally? Growing grass makes sense. Is growing in an economic 
sense anything more than a metaphor? Do we feed or fertilize an 
economy? Do we give it water, or protect it from too much sun? Do we 
just have a peculiar use of language here, or does the language point to 
something more basic? 
Within every normative aspect of reality every (retrocipatory or antici-
patory) analogical moment actually constitutes a fundamental modal 
norm within the aspect concerned. Therefore every biotical analogy at 
the norm-side of any normative aspect represents a fundamental modal 
principle for human action. 
The original meaning of the biotic aspect, as we have seen, comes to 
expression in phenomena designated by terms such as life, growth, 
adaptation, differentiation, integration, finality (goal-directedness/Plan-
mässigkeit), and so on. Acknowledging the analogy between biotic 
development, proceeding from an undifferentiated condition to a more 
differentiated level in itself is not the outcome of a (neo-Darwinistic) 
evolutionistic interpretation. Griffioen (1986:84 ff.) is not sufficiently 
articulated in this regard. Yet his critical comments in respect of 
Dooyeweerd’s analysis of primitive cultures are to the point (Griffioen, 
1986:89-94). Dooyeweerd did not sufficiently account for the truly 
normative dimension present in all cultures – even those who are “thrown 
back” to sub-human realities under the guidance of apostate faith – and 
he also did not effectively apply the structure/direction distinction at the 
level of undifferentiated societies: next to apostate undifferentiated 
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societies there are also undifferentiated ones developing under the 
guidance of biblical faith (such as those recorded in the Old Testament). 
Unfortunately Griffioen nowhere in his illuminating and penetrating article 
explicitly undertakes the task of “locating” the “modal seat” of the term 
differentiation (and its correlate: integration) – which is to be found in the 
biotic mode of reality. In addition he also does not explicitly account for 
the fact that the inter-modal coherence between the normative aspects 
and their foundational connection with the biotical (and other natural) 
mode(s) actually highlights fundamental modal norms requiring positivi-
zation of the process of cultural development. 
The normative meaning of the principle of societal differentiation entails 
that a partial differentiation may lead to an imbalance and disharmony in 
the development of society. This was the case during the Middle Ages 
during which the Roman Catholic church emerged as a quasi-differen-
tiated “super-structure” which excessively expanded its ecclesiastical 
power over the rest of Medieval society that continued the undifferen-
tiated legacy of the Roman familia and the Germanic household com-
munity. Both of these communities assigned absolute and totalitarian 
power to those who occupied the office of head. The chief of the 
Germanic household community had personal dominion over those 
belonging to him. The feudal era continued this undifferentiated “sub-
structure” of Medieval society, which made it possible for the Roman 
Catholic church to establish an ecclesiastically unified culture during the 
later Middle Ages. 
After the disintegration of the Carolingian empire – which acquired its 
peak during the ninth century A.D. – it eventually only was the Roman 
church that managed to act as an integrating force in Medieval society. 
The continued Roman Catholic church domination reached its zenith 
during the first two decades of the 13th century under Pope Innocent III. 
According to the doctrine of the “two swords” the Pope had to handle the 
spiritual sword and the government the earthly sword. 
The strange reference of Christ (Luke 22:38 ff.) to those who do not have 
a sword and should sell their clothes and buy one, is interpreted by the 
early church that the words of Christ, “It is enough”, mean that the two 
swords will be sufficient. However, the church fathers rejected the idea of 
two swords with an appeal to Matthew 26:52: “Put your sword back in its 
place ... for all who draw the sword will die by the sword”. Apparently in 
opposition to this Christ claims that he “did not come to bring peace but a 
sword” (Matt. 10:34). 
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In the fourth century A.D. Ambrose of Mailand interpreted this statement 
in the sense of Ephesians 6:17 – it refers to the sword of the spirit, which 
is the Word of God. Even in the twelfth century Anselm of Laon still 
interpreted the two swords of Luke as the Word of God – in the Old and 
the New Testament (cf. Borst, 1966:34). 
Frederik I Barbarossa (1152-1190), who claimed among others in 1158 
(cf. Stüttler, 1969:32), that the imperial highness is independent from the 
church, did that on the basis of the particular appreciation of the imperial 
mission which evinces, via Charles the Great, continuity with the antique 
Roman emperors. 
In a circular from the year 1157 he emphasizes that this authority is 
independent and only accountable to God. He argues that Christ 
acknowledged it in terms of the theory of two swords: 
Considering that the Divine power, from which all other power in 
Heaven and on earth is derived, has committed to us, whom it had 
anointed, the kingdom and the Empire to rule over ... And as the 
kingdom and the Empire belong to us, being granted to us through the 
election of the princes by God alone, Who has subjected the world in 
the passion of His Son Christ to the rule of the two swords, and since 
the Apostle Peter has enlightened the world with his teaching, ‘Fear 
God, honour the king’, whoever may say that we have obtained the 
Imperial Crown as a benefice from the lord Pope, contradicts the Divine 
institution and the teaching of Peter and shall be guilty of a lie (Ehler & 
Morrall, 1954:61-62). 
This attempt to divorce the authority of the emperor from the church 
increasingly experienced opposition. During the era of Pope Innocent III 
at the beginning of the thirteenth century it was clear that the papal 
power reached its climax. The exceptional personality and stature of this 
Pope certainly contributed to it. He was an outstanding theologian and 
jurist with unique leadership features. In his letter Sicut universitatis he 
articulates his view on the relation between the “spiritual” and the 
“temporal sword” by employing the image of the sun and the moon: 
Just as God, founder of the universe, has constituted two large 
luminaries in the firmament of Heaven, a major one to dominate the day 
and a minor one to dominate the night, so he has established in the 
firmament of the Universal Church, which is signified by the name of 
Heaven, two great dignities, a major one to precide – so to speak – over 
the days of the souls, and a minor one to preside over the nights of the 
bodies ... Both these powers or leadership have their seat established 
in Italy, which country consequently obtained the precedence over all 
provinces by Divine disposition (Ehler & Morrall, 1954:73). 
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Note that both “powers” are now conceived of within the space of the 
“universal church”. Soon this conception would resound within the 
“earthly power”, for in 1232 Emperor Frederik II wrote in a letter to Pope 
Gregory IX that the clergy and the emperorship are only separated in 
respect of the word designating them – in their operation they are united: 
“In truth there exist two swords, but one and the same mother church, 
the generator of our faith, is the sheath for both” (Borst, 1966:41). 
The prelude to the formulation of the famous papal writing Unam 
Sanctam (1302) demonstrates the on-going struggle between the 
spheres of competence of these two “powers”. Kates (1928:8) remarks: 
“The opening of the fourteenth century saw the duel between Boniface 
VII and Philip the Fair; between John II and Louis of Bavaria, or rather 
his spokesman, Marsilius of Padua”. 
Pope Boneface VIII reacted to the fact that King Philip of France taxed 
the French clergy without an antecedent agreement with Rome. 
According to him this act violates the freedom of the church from 
“worldly” control. From the perspective of the emperor it demonstrates 
the fact that the “worldly power” continues to find it unacceptable to be 
subjected to the Pope with regard to secular affairs. However, Bonaface 
unites the theory of the “two swords” in a manner which ascribed more 
power to the church, since, according to him, God – as the Origin of all 
spiritual and temporal power – gave both swords to the church: 
If therefore, the earthly power err, it shall be judged by the spiritual 
power; if the lesser spiritual power err, it shall be judged by the higher, 
competent spiritual power; but if the supreme spiritual power err, it 
could be judged solely by God, not by man (Ehler & Morrall, 1954:92). 
Not only does Bonaface proclaim with this a decisive power of the church 
regarding all “earthly” matters, since he even holds the conviction that 
outside the Roman papacy no salvation could be acquired: “Conse-
quently we declare, state, define and pronounce that it is altogether 
necessary to salvation for every human creature to be subject to the 
Roman Pontiff” (Ehler & Morrall, 1954:92). 
However, during the rise of the Renaissance, this one-sidedness in the 
semi-differentiated structure of Medieval society was challenged by an 
opposing trend, known as late Scholastic nominalism. This reaction 
eventually gave birth to the rise of modern humanism which soon, in 
spite of the Protestant Reformation of the 16th century, took over the 
leading role in the development of Western culture. 
But having broken through the unifying power of the Roman Catholic 
church the new era first witnessed the opening up of new possibilities of 
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differentiation, such as the differentiation between state and church in the 
era in which the nation states started to emerge, the liberation of a 
differentiated economic sphere (eventually completed in the different-
iation of the nuclear family and the modern firm (during the Industrial 
Revolution), and, since the rise of the first universities in France and 
England, the eventual autonomy of scholarly reflection as a differentiated 
power alongside the other differentiated spheres of the developing 
Western society. 
This process of differentiation did not develop in a norm-conformative 
way, since excessive tendencies within the newly differentiating spheres 
of society continued to threaten others, causing a marked disharmony in 
this process of societal development. During the 18th century, for 
example, natural science enthroned by the glorification of human reason 
wanted to subdue institutions for justice and religious convictions to its 
own standards of rationality – just compare the characteristic phrase in 
the Foreword to the first edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781): 
Our age is, in every sense of the word, the age of criticism, and 
everything must submit to it. Religion, on the strength of its sanctity, and 
law, on the strength of its majesty, try to withdraw themselves from it; 
but by so doing they arouse just suspicions, and cannot claim that 
sincere respect which reason pays to those only who have been able to 
stand its free and open examination (Kant, 1956 [1781]:A-xi). 
Similarly, the guidance of the classical liberal idea of the state – with its 
motto of laissez faire, laissez passe – misleads governments to neglect 
their task of integrating the multiplicity of legal interests within their 
territories into one public legal order. The effect was that the new 
capitalist generation of ownership, which emanated from the new 
possibilities created by the Industrial Revolution, was allowed to exploit 
“labour” to such an extent that socialist and eventually communist ideas 
found their way to practical politics – in the final analysis subjecting 
Western societies to an on-going class struggle. Among other things it 
gave birth to the three destructive totalitarian regimes of the 20th century 
(communism, fascism and national socialism), which once again 
demonstrate the catastrophic consequences of a process of develop-
ment guided by an apostate ideology not observing the inner structural 
limits set to the power-sphere of differentiated societal institutions – 
boundaries aptly captured by a phrase already introduced by Groen van 
Prinsterer in the 19th century and elaborated by Kuyper and Dooyeweerd 
during the later 19th century and the 20th century: sphere-sovereignty. 
6. Concluding remark 
An alternative formulation for this article could have read: 
The uniqueness of cultures, universality and normativity …  
248 Koers 67(2) 2002:229-250 
Does Cultural Diversity entail relativism and therefore contradicts the 
norm of Societal Differentiation? 
In summarizing the argumentation advanced we may in conclusion 
phrase it as follows: 
• The enduring shared properties between different cultures testify to 
the presence of universality and constancy lying at the basis of all the 
unique peculiarities evinced by different cultures. 
• Only the acknowledgement of the foundational role of universality and 
constancy with respect to change and development opens up an 
alternative approach. 
• The aim of an alternative approach is to arrive at a constructive 
understanding of the normative meaning of biotic analogies within the 
normative aspects of reality. 
• The interconnectedness between different aspects of reality opens up 
the view that the natural aspects represent normative analogies within 
the normative aspects of reality – designated as modal principles. 
• Consequently, the biotic analogy within the social aspect is 
manifested in the normative principle of social differentiation. 
• Distortions and instances of antinormativity in the process of giving 
form (in the positivisation) of this principle does not cancel its 
overarching and guiding role in societal development. 
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